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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses the economic aspect of coercive diplomacy to show
that new instruments of coercive economic operations created by information
age technology 1) redefine coercive economic operations and that 2) the
vulnerabilities and concerns brought about by these new economic instruments
change the impact coercive economic operations have on coercive diplomacy.
This thesis initially looks to the past, but the intention is to guide continuing future
thought on coercive economic operations. This is important for coercive
diplomacy because policy makers must be aware that ushered in with present
and future technologies are new economic instruments which impact coercive
economic diplomacy.
Coercive economic operations are economic measures designed to
achieve the political objectives of the state. The concept of coercive economic
operations has been around since ancient times when man first bartered, but
there are no historical records to prove that any true economic thought or much
less economic operations existed prior to the nation-state's concern for the
relationship between strategy and economics. Coercive economic operations
are relatively new when compared with the history of technology and economic
development.
Technological innovation has been the most dynamic source of economic
change and development from ancient times and especially in recent centuries.
Technological change and economic development begin in the Paleolithic era.
In this period, contact between tribes or bands was rare, but not so rare as to
prevent some primitive barter trade. Technological evolution was very slow
during this period. In ancient times technological development and economic
operations were centered around the basic need for survival. As the millennium
passed, technology slowly advanced, and along with it evolved early commerce.
The Neolithic age brought technological changes in tools, agriculture, and
domestication of animals, which meant tribes became less nomadic, and
civilizations began to emerge. Civilizations became more established over the
next thousands of years, and people were able to establish relatively permanent
settlements, accumulate stores of material goods, wealth, and devote time to
nonsubsistence activities. As urban civilization evolved around the third
millennium to the Christian era, division of labor, economic organization, and
political structure become increasingly more complex.
It is during this time period (432 BC) that an example of the early use of
coercive economic operations are found. This coercive economic operation is in
the form of sanctions and comes from ancient Greece. The Megarian decree,
issued by Pericles of Athens, restricted entry of Megarian products into Athenian
markets. This sanction was imposed in response to Megara's attempted
expropriation of territory and the kidnapping of three women. Aristophanes, a
writer of the time, claims the sanction played a major role in triggering the
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta.
From the period of classical civilizations, such as those of Greece and
Rome, to around the sixteenth century, empires, kingdoms, and other local
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government units possessed extensive powers of economic control and
regulation. They levied tolls or tariffs on goods entering and leaving their
jurisdictions; local guilds of merchants and artisans fixed wages, prices, and
otherwise regulated working conditions. Economic operations during this period
were at the local level and predatory in character as city-states expanded in
proximity to one another and struggled over boundaries and water rights. The
motivation for economic activity was based on the quest for power and
domination. (Cameron, 1997)
The growth of nationalism and the increasing interregional and
international commerce during the late renaissance period brought about the
first phase of early economic thought as a discipline rather than a means of
survival or something that only peasants were concerned with. The economic
policies of the nation-states during the sixteenth century were to build up
economic power to strengthen the state and to use the power of the state to
promote economic growth and enrich the nation. The objectives were to obtain
revenues to maintain the greatly expanding military forces in order to be more
self-sufficient in times of war. This very attempt to obtain revenues by gaining
more territory or trade at the expense of others often led to war.
The second phase of economic thought began with the publishing of
Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations (1776) by a Scottish
philosopher Adam Smith. This was Smith's attempt to systematize the
economic policies of his day which came to be known as the mercantile
system. The discipline of economic theory continued to develop with different
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political and theoretical approaches. Economic development throughout the
ages continued to be linked to technological advances. These advances laid
the foundation for the industrial revolution and continue to drive capitalism
today. (McCormick, 1987)
There may be a rich history of coercive economic operations prior to
mercantilism, but it does not exist in recorded history. Mercantilism, in this
respect, marks the period when economic operations entered the realm of
diplomacy. The dawn of modern industry which lead into the industrial age
became the basic determinant of economic development and economic thought
after mercantilism. As economic development continued, it became increasingly
evident to nations-states that economics could be a plausible tool for coercive
diplomacy.
Prior to and including World War I (WWI), imposed coercive economic
operations mainly foreshadowed or accompanied war. An example of a coercive
economic operation which foreshadowed war is the United States embargo on
British goods (1809). This embargo was in response to the British Naval Acts
limiting United States trade with France and lead to The War of 1812. Following
the out break of war against Germany in 1914, the United Kingdom published a
list of contraband items and instituted a partial blockade against German ports to
stop the transfer of contraband items. This partial embargo, which is an example
of a coercive economic operation which accompanied war, also became a
complete embargo in 1915 as a reprisal for German submarine warfare. After
WWI economic operations were considered but not imposed as an alternate to
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armed conflict. However, economic operations continued to be imposed to
disrupt military adventures or to compliment a war effort. This is seen in the
cases of the League of Nations verses Greece (1925) where Greece was being
pressured to withdraw it's occupation of Bulgaria and with the Alliance Powers
verses Germany and Japan (1939-1943) to undermine the war efforts of
Germany and Japan.
The move to actually use coercive economic operations as an alternative
to armed conflict did not come into effect until after World War II (WWII). There
was a change in attitude and growing reluctance of nation-states to use armed
force with technological innovation of nuclear weaponry and its capability for
mass destruction. The bomb of the 1940's and weapons of mass destruction of
the 1990's have encouraged states to seek coercive economic operations as an
alternative to armed conflict and mass proliferation.
Economic operations have increased with each decade since their early
use. Coercive economic operations are used in coercive diplomacy for many
reasons deemed important by the naked self interest of the implementing state
as a cure for many foreign policy goals and dilemmas. The early use of
traditional economic operations has been to undermine the war effort, help
destabilize governments, and settle expropriation claims. Additionally, later use
of traditional coercive economic operations has been to halt nuclear proliferation,
protect human rights, and most recently, combat terrorism, and prevent mass
proliferation by weapons of mass destruction.
Though the willingness is high to impose economic operations to achieve
compliance with foreign policy goals, the success rate for traditional economic
operations is relatively low. This may lead one to think that states are imposing
economic operations with little understanding of their likely impact on the target
state. Though the success rate of coercive economic operations is low, they
unfoundedly guarantee, with a reasonable amount of certainty, that pressure will
be applied toward accomplishing a political goal.
The appropriate economic instrument to use has much to do with the
amount of pressure it can exert. As technology advances, opportunities for new
economic instruments surface, which impact coercive economic diplomacy.
This thesis investigates to what extent new instruments of coercive
economic operations created by information age technology redefine coercive
economic operations and examine whether the vulnerabilities and concerns
brought about by these new economic instruments change the impact coercive
economic operations have on coercive diplomacy. This thesis redefines
contemporary coercive economic operations to account for technological
advances and shows how the new vulnerabilities and concerns from the new
economic instruments brought about by technological advances impact
international and interstate coercive economic diplomacy.
This thesis is divided into several sections. The first section is the
introduction. The second section defines coercive economic operations and its
subcategories of economic coercion and economic warfare for clarity and
consistency. The third section discusses coercive economic operations through
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the Industrial Age and the traditional economic instruments used in coercive
economic diplomacy. The fourth section examines the success variables for
economic operations. The fifth section discusses coercive economic operations
in the Post Industrial Age and how Post Industrial Age economic operations
introduce new economic instruments that 1 ) are targeted at new dependencies
brought about through technology, and 2) have created new vulnerabilities and
new concerns for coercive economic diplomacy. This thesis will conclude by
showing the necessity for policy makers to constantly rethink and update
coercive economic operations in order to implement and make use of the most
effective and appropriate economic instruments to be used as coercive
diplomacy.

II. COERCIVE ECONOMIC OPERATIONS DEFINED
A. INTRODUCTION
Governments often use coercive diplomacy to achieve their foreign
policies. Coercive diplomacy is the use of pressure to achieve the foreign
policies or political objectives of a particular government or governments. This
pressure can be extended in many forms: diplomatic, political, economic,
military, or some combination thereof. The pressure can be either unilateral, one
on one; or multilateral, several on one. There can be overt or unpublicized use
of pressure and threats of force or actual use of force. Coercive diplomacy
applies the uses of pressure to achieve a political objective through deterrence,
compellence, and impedance. Deterrence is when it is made known to a state
that some specific behavior is not acceptable and that similar behavior will cost
them, thereby preventing the state from repeating the unwanted behavior. With
deterrence there is a retaliatory means of preventing unwanted behavior.
Compellence is persuading a state to change its behavior. In effect the state is
forced or constrained to do what it does not want to do. Impedance is preventing
the state from performing the unwanted behavior. With impedance the capacity
to perform the behavior is removed.
When economic pressure is imposed as coercive diplomacy, it is called
coercive economic operations. Coercive economic operations are imposed by
Senders on Targets. A Sender, as defined in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
(1985) by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot, is the state, states, or international
organization that imposes the economic operation. A Target, therefore, is the
intended recipient of the Sender's economic operation. When one state engages
as the Sender of an economic operation, it is termed unilateral. Multilateral is
when more than one state engages as the Sender. This thesis will consider
bilateral and international economic operations as multilateral. A Target may
also comprise of one or more states. For example, in 1948 the Soviet Union
imposed the Berlin Blockade against the Unites States, United Kingdom, and
France to prevent West German economic recovery and formation of a West
German government.
Coercive economic operations are divided into two types of economic
measures: economic coercion or economic warfare. Economic coercion is
modifying behavior by economically applying pressure to a Target to deter
undesired behavior or compel desired behavior to achieve a political objective.
In other words, economic coercion is designed to modify "will" and it does this
in two ways: 1) by keeping the Target from doing what it wants, and 2)
getting the Target to do what it does not want to do.
Economic warfare is impeding behavior by economically undermining a
Target thereby retarding or preventing the Target from conducting the
undesired behavior. Economic warfare is designed to undermine the Target's
ability. An example of the difference between economic coercion and
economic warfare is: Actor A wants to prevent Actor B from fighting with him.
Actor A can use coercion and attempt to persuade Actor B through reason,
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bribes, and hints of a big brother at home. Or, Actor A can use warfare and cut
off Actor B's arms thereby preventing him from fighting at all. Both economic
coercion and warfare can be imposed in a non-use of force or use of force
capacity. Economic coercion and warfare can also be overt or unpublicized.
Figure 1 diagrams coercive economic operations in the traditional sense.
Coercive economic operations are subdivided into economic coercion and
economic warfare. The instruments of economic coercion and warfare can be
imposed in a combative or non-combative capacity and are further subdivided as
such. The dotted box represents traditional economic sanctions.
Sanctions are instruments of coercive diplomacy also designed to modify
behavior or undermine capability. Webster's New World Dictionary (1986)
defines sanctions as:
5. a. A coercive measure, as a blockade of shipping, usually taken
by several nations together, for forcing a nation considered to have
violated international law to end the violation.
5.b. a coercive measure, as a boycott, taken by a group to enforce
demands.
This thesis will define sanctions according to the dictionary meaning. Sanctions
will therefore be used to describe instruments of economic coercion and classical








Economic Coercion Economic Warfare
Economic Sanctions
Combative Non-Combative Non-Combative Combative
Figure 1. Traditional Economic Operations
B. ECONOMIC COERCION
Economic coercion is pressure applied through economic instruments to
modify behavior. Economic coercion attacks the target's will versus economic
warfare, which undermines the target's ability. Instruments of economic coercion
are either combative or non-combative. Combative instruments use the threat of
force or actual force in support of the economic instrument. Non-combative
instruments, by design, solely use threat of or actual economic deprivation as the
motivating factor. The categories of economic instruments for economic
coercion are: aid, trade, and finance.
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Aid is defined as grants, loans, and technical and material assistance
provided on a grant or concessional basis by a donor to a recipient. Aid can be
used to establish positions of influence for a sender. Much of the United States
aid to Latin American nations is aid to gain or keep influence. Aid, which is often
difficult to distinguish from aid for influence, can also be used to support a target
government or regime. Aid from the United States to regimes in Latin American
has also been used to establish United States support of a particular regime. A
sender can use aid to apply shear pressure. Pressure is applied by the actual
reduction, threat of reduction or termination of aid unless certain conditions are
met by the target state. (Wientraub, 1982, pp. 12) An example of this is the
United States versus Ceylon (1961-1965) where the United States cutoff aid to
Ceylon for the expropriation (seizing of assets) of United States and United
Kingdom oil refineries.
Trade is the exchange of goods and services including communications,
transportation, and technology (materials and information). Trade is a major
issue for most countries and very integral to their foreign policy. "Trade as an
instrument of economic coercion must involve non-routine uses of trade for the
purpose of applying economic pressure on the target." (Weintraub, 1982, pp.
15). Trade as economic coercion can be implemented positively as an
advantage for the target. This is when the sender uses trade attempts to gain
favor with a target much as when the United States wanted to promote detente
with China by extending trade advantages in the 1970s. Trade as an economic
coercion instrument can also be used negatively as a restriction on imports and
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exports. The United States retaliated against Iran in 1979 for the seizure of
hostages by restricting shipments of military spare parts to Iran.
Conceptually, economic coercion in the form of finance is more difficult to
define than aid or trade. Both aid and trade are often linked to finance. The
increase or decrease of aid or trade to a target can increase, reduce, or halt the
flow of capital to the target. Financial coercion is implemented by the access or
denial of loans, credit, and capital markets. The waning economy of South
Korea today makes them a target for investment coercion. Another example of
investment coercion is the United Stated Trade Act of 1974, which restricts use
of government credit programs to countries on the basis of their emigration
policies.
C. ECONOMIC WARFARE
Economic warfare undermines the targets ability to conduct a certain
behavior or activity, opposed to economic coercion which attacks the target's will.
Economic warfare economically impedes a target through combative or non-
combative instruments. Force is used to either actually impair a target or to
threaten a target's economic value. Traditionally combative instruments use
force against a target economy to undermine it's ability to operate in a wartime
setting. An example of this is during WWII where the Allies bombed Germany's
oil, ball bearing, and rubber facilities. The Allied bombing campaign was
designed to attack Germany's war economy. Non combative instruments, in a
traditional setting, were used as ideological and nationalistic containment
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policies. An example is the United States containment policies against
communism during the Cold War. Non-combative instruments are also used to
limit a target's potential military/technical development. This is often seen with
nuclear weapons as the major world powers attempt to control the spread of
nuclear weapons. An example of this is in 1976 when the United States
threatened too impose sanctions against Taiwan for allegedly reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel into weapons grade material. The categories of economic
instruments for economic warfare are finance and trade.
Finance as an economic instrument of economic warfare involves
investments, freezing of funds, and expropriation of assets. Financial instruments
of economic warfare are aimed at the financial relationship rather than the
commodity. For example, following the invasion of the Falklands, Britain froze
Argentinean financial assets in Britain and suspended new export credits. Britain
could have called Argentina into default, creating a financial crisis for Argentina.
(Daoudi, 1983, pp. 113)
Trade as an instrument of economic warfare includes sieges, blockades,
embargoes, and boycotts on goods and services. A siege uses armed force to
apply pressure by cutting off goods and service. Sieges are designed to
decrease the target's ability to wage war. Sieges are usually conducted during
war and were common prior to the development of sea power.
A blockade is the prevention of commercial activity with a target. An
example of a combative blockade is Allied Powers versus Germany (1939)
where a complete blockade on seaborne German exports and imports was
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placed to help defeat the German war effort. In 1948, the Soviet Union imposed
a non-combative blockade on goods, services and travel against the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France in an attempt to prevent the economic
recovery of West Germany and formation of a West German government.
An embargo is the suspension or prohibition of trade with a target of a
particular commodity. An ongoing example of an embargo is the trade embargo
against Cuba by the United States. In 1935, the League of Nations imposed an
embargo against Italy in response to the invasion of Ethiopia. The embargo was
designed to halt the invasion but ironically was imposed on arms and not oil and
coal, two essential items for a war economy. (Losman, 1979, pp. 2)
A boycott is the abstaining from conducting specific commerce with a
target. A boycott was established in 1947 by the Arab League against Israel.
The object was to impede Israeli development by boycotting sales of goods,
services and land to the Zionist.
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III. ECONOMIC OPERATIONS IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
A. OVERVIEW
Throughout the nineteenth century, the variety of materials and products
entering into international trade continuously increased as a result of advances
in technology and transportation, discoveries of new sources of energy, and the
acquisition of overseas empires. Colonization added to the diversity and
frequency of links between countries; thus international commercial and capital
transactions assumed major dimensions. Commerce was an international
activity necessary for the maintenance of industrial activity and individual
national prosperity. Increased participation in international trade, investment,
and other international financial links multiplied over time. Industrial Age
economic operations have typically focused on disrupting or threatening to
disrupt the flow of goods and commodities. The sender, by influencing the flow
of goods and commodities, brings about behavior modification of the target.
Post Industrial Age economic operations, though still encompassing goods and
commodities, are more systems and information oriented.
The economic activities of the Industrial Age broadened the realm of
economic operations and the implementation of economic warfare and coercion.
The increased participation in financial markets as well as a desire to prevent
war led to the formation of an international law enforcement organization. The
League of Nations was formed as an international policeman for the prevention
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of war and the settlement of disputes through a set of internationally accepted
laws. One instrument the League of Nations would use to enforce the will of the
international community was the imposition of economic sanctions on an
international scale. However, the League of Nations suffered serious
weaknesses in its design that ultimately lead to its downfall. Though the League
of Nations did not survive, the idea of collective security through economic
operations did continue to evolve.
The League was eventually succeeded after WWII by the United Nations
(UN), which gave greater emphasis to the enforcement process. This process
was activated and administered by the United Nations Security Council. The UN
was established as an instituted force for stability, with the right to help ensure
peace through institutionalized norms of behavior, which would encourage the
routine settlement of disputes and limit the use of military force. (Doxley, 1996,
pp. 3) Economic operations could now be imposed on a multilateral level by an
international organization with self-imposed authority. This even further
broadened the political and economic aspects of economic operations.
International organizations did not in and of themselves introduce
multilateral economic operations. They did, however, provide a formal setting
through which to conduct such operations. International organizations impose
economic operations to modify behavior on a multilateral level. But, as seen
during the Cold War, competing ideologies and moral claims create barriers to
international cooperation. The individual state, on the other hand, imposes
economic operations to modify behavior in the interest of the state. It is difficult
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for individual states to garnish multilateral support, but if the individual state is
successful, the likelihood of success is as probable as that of the international
organization.
Post Cold War economic operations tend to focus on international norms
of human rights and democratic values. The post Cold War superpowers impose
economic operations to achieve internal reform in target states. The industrial
age promoted the social, commercial, financial, and technological natures, which
provided the opportunity for a broad range of economic coercion and warfare
measures that are carried on into the Post Industrial Age.
B. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
Three basic categories of economic instruments have been used during
the Industrial Age. These instrument categories are aid, trade, and finance.
Each category can be further delineated into specific instruments. Table I shows
the economic instruments used to imposed economic sanctions from 1946-1986.
Aid instruments are grants, and technical and material assistance
provided to a target. Table I shows that from 1946-1986, specific instruments
used in the aid category were humanitarian grants and material and technical
assistance. Military grants and material and technical assistance were also
instruments of aid employed from 1946-1986. Senders attempted to influenced
the target's behavior by the cessation, reduction, or restriction of these
instruments.
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Trade consist of instruments that deal with the exchange of goods and
services including communications, transportation, and technology. Table I
shows that specific trade instruments imposed from 1946 -1986 were boycotts,
embargoes, blockades, suspensions, and restrictions of goods and services.
Senders thereby influenced exports, imports, and sales of goods in an attempt to
modify a target's behavior.
Finance is the flow of capitol and banking services. Finance is often
linked to aid and trade instruments. Specific financial instruments used during
the Industrial Age were loans, excise tax, and banking services. Loans as
instruments consisted of the issuance, suspension, or adjustment of actual
loans, loan credit terms, and loan interest rates. Excise tax was imposed on
exports and imports as an instrument of economic diplomacy. Freezing or
withholding cash deposits and financial assets and currency degradation were
specific instruments of banking services used as economic sanctions from 1946 -
1986 (See Table I).
C. ECONOMIC COERCION IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
As discussed in a previous section, most economic operations prior to
WWII can be classified as economic warfare, for they either foreshadowed or
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Table I. Economic Sanctions 1946 - 1986.
Sender and target Issue
Arab League v. Israel (1946-) Palestine
US, UN v. North Korea (1 950-) Korean War
UK, US v. Iran (1951-53) Expropriation
India v. Portugal (1 954-61 ) Surrender Goa
US, S. Vietnam v. N. Vietnam Vietnam War
(1954-)
US v Israel (1956-83)




USSR v. Finland ((1 958-59) Nightfrost Crisis
US v. Dominican Republic
(1960-62)
USv. Cuba(1960-)
US v. Ceylon (1960-)
USSR v.Albania (1961-65)
USv. Brazil (1962-64)
UN v. South Africa(1 962-)





France v. Tunisia (1964-66)
USv. Chile (1965-66)
UK, UN v. Rhodesia (1965-79)















Total boycott, shipping blockade
Naval blockade, Total embargo, Asset
freeze
Aid, Economic blockade
Banking services, Currency degradation,
Suspend trade
Freeze assets, Aid, Trade embargo
Aid, Tax incentives, Military arms export
Freeze assets, Military arms export





Suspend all trade, Aid, Wheat credit
Aid
Shipping boycott, Loan restrictions
Aid
Suspend trade
Boycott, Oil embargo, Loans
Aid, Trade tax
Aid, Banking, Loan services
Aid, Freeze assets, Petroleum embargo
Blockade, Bank deposits
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Aid, Military arms export
Arab League v. Egypt
(1978-83)
US v. Libya (1 978-)
USv. Iran (1979-81)
US v. USSR (1980-81)
USv. Iraq (1980-82)





UK, US v. Uganda (1972-79) Amin
US v. South Korea (1973-77) Human Rights
US v. Turkey (1974-78) Cyprus





USv. Guatemala (1 977-)
USv. Nicaragua (1977-79)
USv. El Salvador (1977-81)
USv. Brazil (1978-81)
Aid, Trade embargo
Military aid, loan and export suspension
Economic and military aid embargo
Nuclear aid, Spare parts trade
Trade, Banking services
Military aid, Banking services
Nuclear Reprocessing Nuclear fuel export withheld
Human Rights Military aid, Loans
Bank services, Loans, Military aid
Military and economic aid
Economic aid, Loans
Nuclear supplies export












Military, trade, and oil embargo
Oil boycott, Freeze assets, Arms export
Grain embargo, Fishing trade
Military arms export
Arms, trade embargo, Freeze assets
Arms, trade embargo, banking services
The cases are taken from Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot's Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
(1985).
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accompanied war with a goal of defeating a war effort. After WWII, modifying
behavior of a foreign government without armed conflict was the objective of
economic diplomacy. Aid, trade, and finance were the instruments of economic
coercion used after WWII to attempt to modify the behavior of foreign
governments over foreign policy disputes. Specifically, the goal of post WWII
economic coercion was to deter an action that would have taken place or compel
an action to occur. The United Kingdom used aid and an economic blockade as
instruments of economic coercion to modify the expropriation behavior of Iran
from 1951-53. The United States used aid, tax incentives, and military export
restrictions as instruments of economic coercion against Israel (1956-83) to
modify their behavior regarding Palestine and border rights. The Soviets used
the suspension of trade, restricted economic aid, and wheat credit in an attempt
to destabilize the government of Albania (1961-65).
In the Industrial Age, the protection of human rights became another
objective goal of economic diplomacy. The United States began a campaign in
the 70s imposing instruments of economic coercion to bring about reform of
human rights in Latin America and around the world. The initial goal of economic
coercion to defend human rights was often coupled with the larger goal of
encouraging support for democracy. Economic instruments used in sanctions
against human rights violations in Uruguay (9176-81) were restriction of military
aid and banking services. The restriction or cessation of military aid was a
common economic instrument used for human rights violations in sanctions with
Paraguay (1977-81) and Guatemala (1977-). Loan restrictions were also
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common economic instruments used in sanctions imposed for human rights
violations in Paraguay (1977-81), Guatemala (1977-), and El Salvador (1977-
81).
There was a push in the 1970s and 1980s to establish nuclear safety
standards and regulate the escalation of nuclear weapons. Economic diplomacy
was mainly imposed by the United States and Canada in attempts to control the
acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities and to control the reprocessing of
spent fuel. The United States used trade as the economic instrument by
stopping the shipment of nuclear fuel to Taiwan (1976-77) in order to persuade
them to stop nuclear reprocessing. Canada (1974-76) used sanctions against
India to stop India's testing of nuclear weapons. The economic instruments of
the sanction were suspension of nuclear aid and spare parts shipments.
World attention was initially focused on terrorism in 1960 with plane
hijackings and then again in the 1970s with the killing of the Israeli athletes at the
1972 Olympics in Munich. In 1980 the United States government began to list
countries with suspected or know terrorist activities or terrorist suppliers. The
United States imposed instruments of economic coercion on these listed
countries in an attempt to limit their terrorist activities or suppliers. In 1980-82,
the United States imposed a sanction against Iraq in response to Iraq's support
for an active terrorist group. Suspension of military arms exports was the
economic instrument used to implement the sanction. The United States also
imposed sanctions on Iran (1984-) and Syria (1986-) in response to terrorism.
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The economic instruments used to impose the sanctions were arms and trade
embargoes, freezing Iranian assets, and denying banking services for Syria.
D. ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, economic warfare was limited to
disrupting the small volume of international trade due to the fact that trade
represented a generally minor element of economic activity in any country.
(Doxley, 1971, pp. 15) During the Industrial Age, access to minerals such as
iron ore, petroleum, cooper, manganese, nickel, and other alloys and to
commodities such as rubber and cotton were vital for industrial powers to
maintain the war effort, for no states are self sufficient. "Economic strength has
always been recognized as a vital component of power and in the course of war
it is an obvious target for attack by military as well as by economic means."
(Doxley, 1971, pp. 14). The classical instruments of economic warfare were
blockades, embargoes, and military actions. An example of military action as an
instrument of economic warfare is the WWII Allied bombings of industrial targets
such as oil refineries and rubber plants. These bombings were designed to
incapacitate the German war effort.
The growth of the large scale manufacturing industry during the Industrial
Age in Europe and the United States, as well as other parts of the world, opened
further possibilities for economic warfare. The world also moved toward a more
non-combative implementation of the instruments of economic warfare.
Economic warfare is imposed in combative and non-combative roles. The
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instruments of economic warfare from 1946-1986 (See Table I) were trade and
finance. Specific trade instruments are blockades, embargoes, and boycotts.
Traditional financial instruments of economic warfare are asset freezes and aid
cessation or reduction.
Combative instruments of economic warfare have the threat or actual use
of force in their implementation. In 1950, the United States implemented a naval
blockade, total trade embargo, and freezing of assets of North Korea in response
to the invasion of South Korea and to impede the North Korean war effort. The
actual use of force accompanied these sanctions. In 1954, the United States
preceded the conflict in Vietnam with the use of economic instruments. Asset
freezes, aid suspension, and total trade embargo were the means of economic
warfare to impede North Vietnam's ability to wage war. The goal was to bring
about a political solution to the turmoil between North and South Vietnam.
Arab League v. Israel (1946-) is an example of instruments of economic
warfare imposed in a non-combative role. The Arab League implemented a
trade blockade and a boycott of Jewish business and services to bring about the
economic collapse of the Zionist. The collapse of the Zionist would prevent the
creation of the State of Israel. A famous example of the non-combative use of
economic warfare is the United States against Cuba (1960-). The United States
imposed a total embargo and canceled aid to Cuba in an attempt to undermine
Fidel Castro and his regime.
Table I illustrates the role economic operations have played in conduct of
foreign policy within the Industrial Age from 1946-1986. The instruments, aid,
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trade and finance, whether their nature was one of economic coercion or
economic warfare, are goods, services, and commodity oriented. During the
Industrial Age, the willingness to impose economic operations, as well as the
amount of certainty that a foreign policy goal would be achieved by the economic
operation, was relatively high.
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IV. SUCCESS VARIABLES FOR ECONOMIC OPERATIONS
There is an ongoing debate over whether economic operations are
effective tools for the implementation of foreign policy. Of over 105 worldwide
cases studied by Hufbauer and Schott (1985), only 35% were successful. This is
a generally accepted figure among experts in the field. A successful sanction as
defined by Margaret Doxey is "one which succeeds in producing the desired
behavioral response from the individual or group to which it is communicated."
(Doxey, 1972, pp. 529). This is an adequate definition of success, but for this
analysis Hufbauer and Schott provide a better tailored definition which states
that "the success of an economic episode—as viewed from the perspective of
the sender country—has two parts: the extent to which the policy outcome
sought by the sender country was in fact achieved, and the contribution made by
sanctions to a positive outcome." (Hufbauer and Schott, 1985, pp 32). We follow
this view.
There are many correlates, which have been and need to be explored
before a model can be constructed for the successful implementation of
economic operations. One may argue that a conclusive model of economic
operations is impossible due to the inconsistent and unpredictable behavior of
leaders, citizens, and states. However, a conclusive model will not be based on
correlates derived from empirical study, but rather on the preliminary issue of
bargaining.
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This analysis will make no attempt to evaluate the merits of the particular
foreign policy pursued through the use of economic diplomacy. Rather, it will
focus on examining analytically and then empirically the variables that determine
the probable success or failure of economic operations.
A. LEVERAGE MODEL AND SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC OPERATIONS
Companies pursuing corporate strategies, candidates running for political
office, and members of Congress trying to pass a bill are playing a game. Each
player in these games would like to end the game with the highest possible
payoff. Being successful in the game is based on leverage potential and the
cost to counter the leverage. In the end, the players reach a bargain. (Straffin,
1993, pp. 1) The game is therefore a bargaining relationship, and the key to
success or failure is leverage. Leverage is the power to act effectively in the
bargaining relationship. Leverage is derived from the relative degree to which
one is in a position to threaten and/or promise something of value. For example,
Actor A will do something for Actor B if Actor B does something for Actor A, or
Actor A will do something to Actor B if Actor B does not do something for Actor
A. The key to Actor As success is the amount of leverage that Actor A can
apply. Actor A must be able to get in a position to offer or to threaten to take
something of value from Actor B. The more leverage Actor A has, the better the
position Actor A is in to offer or to take something of value from Actor B.
Consequently, Actor B, being a rational player, will attempt to counter Actor A's
leverage. The degree to which Actor B can counter proportionally affects the
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impact of Actor A's leverage. Leverage is therefore the basic element to success
or failure in a bargaining relationship.
There are three variables that determine one's ability to bring leverage to
bear. First, Actor A either has something, or is able to take something Actor B
values. It does not matter what the object of value is, but that Actor B places
intrinsic value in it. Actor A can take something of value either directly or
indirectly. When Actor A takes something indirectly, it is done through a third
party, hence a boomerang effect. For example, Actor A imposes an action on
Actor B which prevents Actor B from manufacturing widgets. Actor C is now
affected because of its dependence on widgets. Actor A in effect has leverage
over Actor C.
The second variable is the credibility of Actor A's offer or threat to take
something of value from Actor B. Credibility is the quality, capability or power to
elicit belief in the offer or threat to take something of value. The credibility is
either real or perceived. One has real credibility when there is a record of
following through with offers and threats. If one does not have a record of
following through, then essentially one does not have a tangible credibility. In
the leverage game however, perceptions are reality. If Actor A is strong, but
Actor B thinks Actor A is weak, then Actor B is not going to accept Actor A's offer
or threat to take of something of value. Actor B is going to stand and fight. The
reverse is also true, if Actor A is weak, but Actor B thinks Actor A is strong, then
Actor B will back down from a fight and consequently accept Actor A's offer or
threat.
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The third variable is the expected cost of compliance (CC). The cost of
compliance is the cost associated with doing something against ones will in order
to gain or retain something of value. Cost of compliance is how Actor B weighs
the value of what he wants against the cost of doing what Actor A says.
These first two variables determine ones leverage potential. The degree
of leverage potential is a function of 1) the value placed in something and 2) the
credibility of the offer or threat to take something. One has a high degree of
leverage potential if there is a credible offer or threat to take something of value.
On the other hand, if there is nothing of value to offer or threaten to take away,
and/or there is no credibility, then there is little to no leverage potential.
The amount of leverage, which may be brought to bear, is a function of
the leverage potential versus the cost of compliance. All things being equal,
Figure II shows the probable leverage (in the quadrants) as a function of
potential leverage (Y axis) and the cost of compliance (X axis). The high
leverage quadrant represents a situation where there is a high degree of
leverage potential and a low CC. The upper right quadrant represents a
situation of low to no leverage. Here there is a high degree of leverage potential
and a high CC. The bottom left quadrant also represents a situation of low to no
leverage. In this quadrant there is a low degree of leverage potential and a low
CC. The no leverage quadrant represents a situation with a low degree of
leverage potential and a high CC.
Given the leverage variables, there are four situations that the two players
may encounter. First, Player A may be strong in variables one and two and
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therefore have a high potential for leverage, provided the CC to Player B is low.
Second, if the CC to Player B is low, and Player A is strong in only variable one
or two, then a situation of low to no leverage potential exist for Player A. Third, if
the CC to Player B is high, and Player A is strong in variables one and two, then
once again, a situation of low to no leverage potential exist for Player A. The
final situation that may be encountered is when Player A is not strong in either
variable one or two and the CC for Player B is high. Consequently Player has no
















Figure 2. Leverage Potential versus Cost of Compliance.
In the best case, arguably, an actor is able to bring leverage to bear with
regards to the three variables. The worst case is to have no leverage with
regards to the variables. Most situations will require some enhancement to
obtain a position of greater leverage than one's opponent. Leverage is also
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subject to change over time, especially as an adversary is able to improve his
leverage. Leverage is a zero-sum game. The relative balance of influence in
variables.
Economic operations are bargaining relationships and leverage is what
determines when economic coercion and warfare are likely to be used
effectively. The leverage variables are key to evaluating the likely success of
economic operations. Success of economic operations is dependent on the
Sender's ability to apply leverage on the Target to bring about compliance.
In the situations of low or no leverage potential (See Figure 2), it is
incumbent upon the Sender to analyze the relative influence of the variables and
then find ways of enhancing his leverage potential. One way the Sender can
enhance his leverage potential is to involve other players. The Sender is more
likely to threaten or to take something from the Target if more states are involved
with something that the Target values.
A Sender's leverage potential on a Target is influenced by substitution,
dependency and active counter measures. Substitution, dependency and active
countermeasures correlate to the expected cost of non-compliance (CNC) for the
Target. The cost of non-compliance is the cost a Target will incur to counter a
Sender's offer or threat of something valued. The degree, to which the target is
able to singularly or in combination use substitution, dependency, or active
counter measures against the Sender's offer or threat, is inversely proportional to
the Target's cost of non-compliance. For example, all things being equal and
using a single factor, if the Target has a high capability for substitution, then the
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CNC is comparatively low. Or once again, all things being equal if the target is
highly dependent on the Sender, the Target's CNC may be comparatively high.
The cost is therefore a function of substitutability, dependency, and active
countermeasures.
Substitution is the replacement or the obtaining of an object of value with
something else of comparable value from an alternate source. For example, if
Actor A cannot buy widgets from Actor B, then Actor A buys widgets from Actor
C or uses a different comparable widget. The greater the opportunity for
substitution, the higher the probability of non-compliance due to the erosion of
leverage.
Dependency is the degree to which one is contingent on another. All
things being equal, the greater the dependency of the Target on the Sender, the
greater the probability of compliance. Conversely, the less dependency, the
greater the probability of non-compliance.
Active counter measures are employed either directly or indirectly. Active
countermeasures are factors that improve the Targets counter-leverage, as
opposed to substitutability and dependency which influence the Sender's
leverage. All of these factors work together as a function of CNC. A direct
counter measure offers or threatens something of value. For example, Actor A
credibly threatens something Actor B values. As a direct counter, Actor B then
credibly threatens something Actor values. This example assumes a certain
degree of dependency between Actors A and B. There is now a tug of war
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between the two actors in whom the ultimate outcome is determined by the CNC
versus the CC for both Actors A and B.
An indirect counter measure is when the Target attempts to apply
leverage in a roundabout manner. To do this, the Target must utilize
intermediary sources, which can deliver a credible offer or threat. For example,
an Arab state is unable to counter the leverage potential of a major western
power. The Arab state evokes "Arab Sovereignty" to rally the Arab world against
the western power to lower the western power's leverage potential on the Arab
state. The Arab world also brings leverage to bear against the western power as
a credible offer or threat in defense of the Arab State. Similar to the direct
counter measure case, a tug of war between the western power and the Arab
world develops. The outcome is determined by the CNC associated with the
western power pursuing the original threat against the Arab State versus the CC
associated with the threat from the Arab world. All things being equal, the Arab
state has effectively utilized an intermediary source to bring leverage to bear.
The leverage, which may be brought to bear, is a function of CNC versus
CC. There are two possible outcomes. First, if CNC is greater than CC, then
there is a situation of compellence, where Player B accepts the terms of Player
A. Second, if CC greater than CNC, then there is a situation of defiance, where
Player B does not accept the terms of Player A. Leverage is a function of the
disparity between CNC and CC. The relationship between CNC and CC
determines the amount of leverage that may be brought to bear in a given
situation. This is the leverage model adapted from the research of Gordon H. Mc
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Cormick, Ph.D. (McCormick, 1998) For example, a Sender has a credible offer
or threat to something Target values. The Target however, is able to counter the
Sender's leverage as a function of substitutability and dependency. In lowering
the leverage potential of the Sender, the Target has also lowered it's CNC. The
Target must now decide if it will comply with the threat or not. The target must
weigh the value of what it wants (CNC) against the cost of doing what the
Sender wants (CC).
Figure 3 graphically displays the Leverage Model. (McCormick, 1998). As
explained earlier, substitutability, dependency and active countermeasures
influence the degree of leverage potential. CNC is a function of substitutability,
dependency and active counter measures. The degree of leverage that may be
brought to bear is a function of CNC versus CC. The relationship between CNC
and CC is the leverage model. Figure 3 expands on the concepts presented
earlier in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows leverage as a function of the CNC (Y-axis)
and the CC (X-axis). The white area above the diagonal line represents
positions of leverage based on a CNC/CC relationship. The shaded area
represents positions of no leverage based on the CNC/CC relationship. In the
positions of low or no leverage, it is incumbent upon the Sender to analyze the
relative influence of the variables and then find ways on enhancing his leverage
potential. One way the Sender can enhance potential is to get other players
involved. The Sender is more likely to threaten or take something, if more states









Figure 3. Leverage Model.
There are some considerations to be made with regard to leverage and
threats. First, there is the issue of whether to impose a threat publicly or
privately. Both public and private threats have advantages and disadvantages,
which should be taken into consideration on a situational basis. With a private
threat, all parties involved save face. For example, Country A goes to Country B
and not only shows them, but gives them a high value target list. Country A then
explains to Country B that if it does not comply, then Country A will bomb those
high value targets. Country B has no other options and concedes begrudgingly.
Point A indicates Country A's leverage position. (See Figure 3). Country A gets
what it wants and brings less leverage to bear than would be needed if done
publicly. Country B saves face and does not incur the additional cost of being
seen to back down in public or the political cost associated with publicly backing
down. The disadvantage of a private threat is that there is no credibility for the
38
next time, which relates to the leverage position moving to point B on the graph.
(See Figure 3).
The disadvantage to a public threat is that the Sender will need additional
leverage to compensate for the fact that the Target is incurring an additional
price to be seen backing down in public. This is indicated by point C on the
Leverage Model. (See Figure 3). The advantage of a public challenge is that the
Sender is thinking beyond the immediate incident to the future. For example, the
United States publicly imposes sanctions against terrorism (US v Iraq, 1980-82;
US v Iran, 1984; US v Syria, 1986). The sanctions were not only intended to
punish the offender, but to make an example for others in an attempt to deter
terrorism. The Sender wants to make an example for others, though it will cost
more now. The tradeoff is the increased credibility gained in future operations as
indicated by either point A or point B on the Leverage Model. (See Figure 3).
B. SUCCESS CORRELATES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
As a general rule, successful economic operations are characterized by
the following common trends and basic policy correlates. All things being equal,
the common trends and correlates, which tend to be true, have been discussed
in the literature. The correlates that follow, for example, are drawn from the
empirical studies of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elloitt's, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered , 1985, Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining
Multilateral Economic Sanctions. (1992), and Margret P. Doxey, Economic
Sanctions and International Enforcement. (1996). They relate general
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correlates for successful sanctions. Economic operations will tend to be
successful, it is said, when the following hold:
1
.
The objective is relatively modest, thus lessening the importance of
multilateral cooperation, which is often difficult to obtain. International
cooperation with the widest possible international consensus must be
obtained to achieve the results for more difficult objectives. This
decreases the chances a rival power will bother to step in with offsetting
assistance for the target.
2. The target is much smaller, economically weaker, and politically more
unstable than the collective sender imposing economic operations.
3. The economic operation must impart some sort of economic hardship
after having exhausted all other diplomatic means of the sender.
4. The selected retaliatory economic operation must be appropriate in the
view of the nature of the reason the economic operation is imposed and
the objective desired. The sender must also consider the target country's
internal and external dynamics, which often dictate the most appropriate
economic operation to undertake. These actions by the sender may
prevent hardening the target's behavior through moderate and flexible
economic measures. This in turn may also help to set the example for
other potential targets.
5. The burden of the sender of an economic operation should be shared
equitably to avoid unduly affecting the individual states of a multilateral
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economic operation or the state internally when unilaterally imposed. A
cost benefit analysis should be conducted in advance.
The above factors enhance the basic leverage potential of the Sender,
thereby increasing the probability that the leverage brought to bear in an
economic operation will be successful. Economic operations, as we have said,
are deemed to be successful if the Target complies with the Sender's demands.
Though there are often mixed domestic and foreign agendas that underline the
imposition of economic operations, these actions need not be a controversial or
complicated tool of coercive diplomacy. The basic compliance of the Target is
dependent on the amount of leverage the Sender has to bring to bear. To
impose economic operations as coercive diplomacy, one needs merely to begin
examining the leverage potential and then explore ways to enhance one's




V. ECONOMIC OPERATIONS IN THE POST INDUSTRIAL AGE
A. PREFACE
Industrial Age economic operations focused on disrupting or threatening
to disrupt the flow of goods, services, and commodities. Continuing scientific
discovery, technical progress, and cultural attitudes will change the character of
economic life, war, and international relationships in the Post Industrial Age. The
vast increases in information technology have promoted greater interlinkage of
nations, communications, and information flow. Post Industrial Age economic
operations evolved as a result of information technology and its influence on
economic systems. Past efforts of economic coercion have been commodity
oriented, attempting to disrupt the flow of certain critical commodities for the
purpose of bringing political or military pressure to bear. Post Industrial Age
economic operations, however, are not about disrupting commodities as such.
Post Industrial Age economic operations are about disrupting information
systems that allow or underlie the efficient economic operation of a target
economy. So rather than target commodities directly, as with Industrial Age
economic operations, Post Industrial Age economic operations target information
networks, which may directly disrupt commodities flow as a result of inefficient
economic operation. (Shubik, 1979, pp. 215)
The Post Industrial Age economic process critically depends on modern
information technology. It is therefore better for Post Industrial Age economic
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operations to target the information technology dependency. This dependency
evolves around the additional high efficiency that information technology lends to
the market process. For example, the GNP or income effect associated with a
collection of small local markets is significantly lower than the national income
effect associated with a single highly efficient national market. Modern
information technology allows the economic process to engage a large national
market in real time. This is opposed to the traditional economic process, which
has been, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent on collections of local
markets in the absence of an efficient real time method of nationally prosecuting
market transactions. So there are efficiency effects that transfer at the higher
national income levels associated with introducing modern information
technology. Targeting this can disintegrate a national economy in singular or
multiple sectors and can do so very rapidly. (McCormick, 1998)
The Post Industrial Age economic operations introduce new instruments
that are targeted at new dependencies brought about by information technology.
If one is able to target the dependencies successfully, the new instruments offer
a promise to have an impact much greater than the sum of their parts. In a
sense, the new economic instruments target the inherent efficiency of the
modern Post Industrial economy. A significant percentage of the national
income of the modern economy is dependent on maintaining efficiencies. The
new instruments take this away. The new instruments can be perfected in and of
themselves, so that a small amount of effort generates a big effect. (McCormick,
1998)
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There is an aimed approach to Post Industrial Age economic operations
that allows the sanctioning country to target "the enemy" instead of the
vulnerable sectors of the targeted society, the poor, the very young, the very old,
and the sick. There was a hypocrisy during the Industrial Age when a
sanctioning country campaigned for oppressed women one day, then imposed
an embargo which increased infant mortality the next. Traditional economic
sanctions most often impact the lowest strata of society and miss inspiring the
political response that the Sender desires. This is due to the fact that regimes,
the elite, and companies in a target country, more often than not, have the ability
to isolate themselves from the economic hardship of sanctions. Traditional
economic sanctions are dull instruments that, more often than not, deliver a
broad detrimental impact on the population of a target country. This dull
instrument has become less acceptable in today's society, which focuses more
and more on the humanitarian impact and economic destruction of the target
country. (Hufbauer, 1997, pp. 1) Post Industrial Age economic operations, which
orient primarily on information systems, have a greater ability to focus the
Sender's aim on the true target: regimes, the elite, and companies.
Post Industrial Age economic operations are not entirely new. Post
Industrial Age economic operations still employ the Industrial Age economic
measures of aid, trade, and finance, but attempt to target the systems basis of
these economic functions. This section speculates on economic operations in
the Post Industrial Age.
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B. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS OF THE POST INDUSTRIAL AGE
Economic instruments of the Post Industrial Age can both cost less for the
Sender and cost more to the Target. Their potential impact on regimes, the elite,
and companies, all things being equal, is significantly greater. Information
technology makes this possible. Economic instruments in the Post Industrial
Age target four systems: information, finance, market, and electronic. These
four systems produce four categories of economic instruments: information
manipulation, financial manipulation, market manipulation, and electronic
manipulation.
Information manipulation is using data to mislead, gain a position of
leverage, or gain intelligence for the purpose of bringing economic hardship on a
Target. Information in modern society has become the target of potentially
hostile groups and nations to apply coercive pressure or warfare. Individuals are
also creating havoc by breaking into secure networks and disrupting services or
committing other criminal acts. Examples of such disinformation campaigns are
the dissemination of misinformation about the quality or safety of a target state's
products or the safety conditions for tourists. (Reisman, 1992, pp. 30)
The following case, United States versus Colombia (1996), taken from
Hufbauer and Winston's Smarter Sanctions: Updating the Economic Weapon
(1997), is an example of information manipulation aimed at regimes and
companies. In 1996 President Clinton decertified Colombia for inadequate
cooperation against narcotics trafficking. Narcotics shipments were regularly
entering the United States disguised as legitimate merchandise. Aid was
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suspended to the country, but additional trade sanctions were not imposed.
President Clinton appeared to take the advice of President Ernesto Samper, who
in response to threats of trade sanctions, reminded the United States
government that farmers will grow drugs if not allowed to cultivate bananas,
flowers, and coffee. Instead the United States created a list of individuals and
companies with known links to the Cali drug cartel. They were then barred from
doing business in the United States.
In the case, United States versus Colombia (1996), we see information
being used by Colombia to make claims in such a way as to mislead the United
States into thinking that sanctioning Colombia would force farmers to grow
drugs. The United States used information to obtain a blacklist of individuals and
companies. With this list there was an attempt to disrupt the financial processes
of the Cartel.
Financial manipulation can be defined as any act that tampers with the
fiscal processes of a Target. An example of financial manipulation is the
proactive external movement of funds or the infiltration of funds into a country to
improve its market situation and consequently influencing its political elections.
(Reisman, 1992, pp. 30) The injection of massive quantities of currency into a
country may also be used as a tactic of economic warfare. Another possibility
uses misinformation and currency sabotage by leaking a false report from the
Open Market committee to cause a run on Country A's currency. (Shubik, 1979,
pp. 224)
47
Market manipulation is the tampering with trade to create economic
hardship for the Target. Sender control over a target's position in the world
market, for example, can make a target state vulnerable to economic
destabilization. Not only is the current government vulnerable to economic
hardships, but by causing the government to be preoccupied with external
matters, the target state's influence is in jeopardy. (Shubik, 1979)
Another possibility is manipulating the food industry. Food export cartels
could be an important force in economic warfare. The concern here is the
conflicts with ethical beliefs, public opinion, and governmental policy. (Shubik,
1979, pp. 220)
Still another example is manipulating a Target's market perception when
the Sender has a clear advantage in the damage exchange rate. If the Target
perceives a need to "keep up with the Jones," as in an arms race situation, then
the Target is more likely to pour in and lock up technical and general resources.
Electronic manipulation is the orchestration of economic hardship through
the use of computers and networks. For example, the introduction of computer
viruses can be used to destroy or incapacitate the financial network of a target.
Electronic manipulation increases the vulnerabilities of a target state through
electronic attacks on the Target's system.
The next two examples deal with credit and data bank systems. A Sender
disrupting check clearing facilities and preventing checks from clearing could
cause a monetary change in the float and confusion and discomfort for a Target.
A technically savvy Sender could also flood the market of a Target with duplicate
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credit cards or distort the bank data on credit information, creating havoc to the
Target's credit system. Data bank and computer communication sabotage
become more probable and effective as credit systems become more
sophisticated. (Shubik, 1979, pp. 227)
The Post Industrial Age experiences increasing international linkage and
interdependence. The international community is therefore subject to new
economic instruments and the many effects they might have on the international
economy if imposed as economic diplomacy. Economic instruments must be
continually updated because there is a spectrum that conventional and
unconventional economic operations oscillate continuously. As economic
instruments evolve, blend into each other, and become universally accepted or
rejected, the boundary between conventional and unconventional economic
operations moves back and forth along a continuum. Economic instruments that
are acceptable within the norms and laws of the international community are on
the contemporary side of the continuum. Economic instruments that are new in
concept or use, unacceptable to established norms, or unlawful by international
law are on the unconventional side of the continuum. Piracy and smuggling are
examples of economic instruments on the fringes of being unconventional due to
their being either unlawful or outside established norms of economic conduct.
(Shubik, 1979, pp. 213)
The Post Industrial Age economic operations use information based
economic instruments to impose economic hardship. Information based
economic instruments enable a Sender to attack the economic function of a
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Target state across a broad spectrum of the economy. While the tools are often
new, the end goal is the same, to gain a position of leverage to enable the
Sender to modify the behavior of a Target.
C. IMPOSING ECONOMIC OPERATIONS IN THE POST INDUSTRIAL AGE
There are some other aspects of imposing economic instruments in the
Post Industrial age which merit discussion. The continuum mentioned previously
allows economic instruments to be imposed either conventionally or
unconventionally. Conventional economic instruments involve universally
accepted actions that generally conform to international law. Unconventional
economic instruments have the ability to deliver economic hardships through
other than accepted means. For example, counterfeiting of another state's
currency and the infiltration of forged bills into the international market would be
characterized by most as unconventional as well as unlawful. (Riesman, 1992,
pp. 30) In the Post Industrial Age, both unconventional and conventional
instruments use information as a tool to bring about economic hardship
Economic instruments may also be implemented in an overt or covert
manner. Whatever can be done overtly may also be done covertly. An overt use
of an economic instrument is communicative as well as destructive. The Target
has the option of modifying certain behavior in order to have the economic
hardship terminated. On the other hand, the covert use of the same economic
instrument sends no message. The Target may not recognize the action as a
signal to modify behavior, know who the Sender is, or what action might be taken
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to end the economic hardship. Overt use of economic instruments is open for
international scrutiny while covert use of the coercive economic operations is not.
As the international economic system becomes more interdependent,
information technology provides the possibilities for larger states to use
economic instruments covertly against smaller states that could make a mockery
of many formal norms. An example of this is the movement of funds or the
infiltration of funds into a country to improve its market situation and
consequently influencing its political elections. (Reisman, 1992, pp. 30) At the
same time unconventional and covert instruments make it possible for
unscrupulous smaller states to impose economic leverage on larger states for
self-serving purposes. An example of this is bribery. (Reisman, 1992, pp. 29)
D. COMMENTS ON SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC OPERATIONS IN THE POST
INDUSTRIAL AGE
Information technology broadens the range of economic instruments for
the would-be Target as well as the Sender. Information levels the playing field
by making it possible for a smaller Sender to impose sanctions on a relatively
larger Target. Leverage is still the key to gaining a position of influence in the
Post Industrial Age and is dependent on the technological ability of the Sender or
Target. Information based economic instruments reduce the implementation
costs to the Sender because of the systems orientation. Information based
economic instruments also reduce the damage to the Target. However,
unilaterally speaking, Post Industrial Age economic instruments tend to raise the
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cost of gaining leverage potential because of the high ability for substitution due
to increased interlinkage and interdependence of the international community.
The post WWII era is marked by a great interest in human rights. A
Sender state will gain political points by imposing economic instruments which
are less punishing to the powerless citizens of a state. These reductions
increase the political clout of the Sender both internally and externally. The
economic instruments involved, however, must still carry a degree of economic
impact necessary to gain the objective desired. All economic operations have
varying degrees of political and economic effectiveness. The volume of




Economic operations in the service of coercive diplomacy face many
criticisms. A few of the criticisms are the humanitarian impact of economic
operations, the economic destruction of the target country, the commercial cost,
and mostly, whether these economic operations work at all. Actions over the
past forty years indicate that economic operations are more often the policy of
choice as a means of coercive diplomacy. Economic operations provide an
alternative to military force, and are hoped to provide a big effect at a small price
in meeting foreign policy objectives.
Economic operations merit re-examining due to the changing
environment. Just as technology and tactics for the use of military force
continually change, the economic instruments for coercive economic diplomacy
must also adapt to technological advances and economic realities. As a result of
advancements in information technology the commodities focus of economic
operations in the Industrial Age changed in the Post Industrial Age to a focus on
information systems. The new instruments of the Post Industrial Age economic
operations changed the opportunities and constraints of the Sender and Ttarget
states. In light of these changes and the ongoing criticisms of economic
operations, sanctions may not survive as a very viable policy tool without
redefinition and re-examination.
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This thesis initially looked at the rich history of economic operations. The
discussion focused on the development of economic thought and the relationship
between strategy and economics. The highlights of this section are:
1. Technological innovation has been the most dynamic source of
economic change and development.
2. Economic operations enter the realm of diplomacy with
Mercantilism.
3. Prior to WWI, economic operations foreshadowed or
accompanied armed conflict.
4. As a means of coercive diplomacy, economic operations
become an alternative to armed force after WWII.
Governments use coercive diplomacy to achieve their foreign policies.
Coercive diplomacy is the use of pressure to achieve the foreign policies or
political objectives of a particular government or governments. The second
section defines the terms used for coercive economic operations. The important
points in this section are:
1. Economic operations apply the use of pressure to achieve
political objectives through economic coercion or warfare.
2. Economic coercion modifies the "will" of a Target through
deterrence or compellence.
3. Economic warfare undermines the Target's ability to conduct a
certain behavior or activity.
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4. The categories of instruments for traditional economic
operations are aid, trade, and finance.
The third section examines the economic activities of the Industrial Age,
which broadened the realm of economic operations and the implementation of
economic warfare and coercion. Industrial Age economic operations have
typically focused on disrupting or threatening to disrupt the flow of goods and
commodities. The Sender, by influencing the flow of goods and commodities,
brings about behavior modification of the Target. The highlights of the third
section are:
1. Industrial Age economic operations have been commodities
oriented.
2. The categories of economic instruments can be further
delineated into specific instruments to apply economic pressure.
3. Industrial Age economic diplomacy has often attempted to
legislate behavior in human rights, nuclear safety, and terrorism.
There is an ongoing debate over whether economic operations are
effective tools for the implementation of foreign policy. The fourth section
focuses on examining analytically and then empirically the variables that
determine the probable success or failure of economic operations. The
important points in this section are:
1 . Bargaining relationships are based on leverage.
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2. There are three variables that determine one's ability to bring
leverage to bear.
3. The leverage model states that leverage is a function of the cost
of non-compliance versus the cost of compliance.
4. There are basic policy correlates that characterize successful
economic operations.
The fifth section discusses economic operations in the Post Industrial
Age. Vast increases in information technology have promoted greater
interlinkage of nations, communications, and information flow. Post Industrial
Age economic operations evolved as a result of information technology and its
influence on economic systems. The Post Industrial Age economic process
critically depends on modern information technology. The highlights of this
section are:
1. Post Industrial Age economic operations disrupt information
systems that allow or underlie the efficient economic operation
of a target.
2. Post Industrial Age economic operations introduce new
instruments that are targeted at new dependencies brought
about by information technology.
3. Economic instruments in the Post Industrial Age target and
manipulate four systems, information, finance, market, and,
electronic.
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All economic operations have varying degrees of political and economic
effectiveness. Economic operations must be adapted to the political and
economic realities of today. Economic operations must be thought through in
order to design an appropriate sanction and to determine when imposing a
sanction is a rational choice. There are some issues that require further
investigation because of the potential impact they have on the successful
implementation of economic operations. These issues are also food for thought
that will help guide policy makers in designing intelligent sanctions.
1. Foreign policy versus domestic policy. Are sanctions imposed for
foreign policy objectives or to satisfy domestic pressures on the
government to do something?
2. Dynamic versus static. Is a short or long term effect desired from the
sanction? Dynamic sanctions must take into consideration
reconstitution and regeneration by the Target.
3. Authoritarian versus democratic regime. Sanctions are dull
instruments that attack the economy and undermine the GNP. The
ability to influence the behavior of a dictator under certain
circumstances depends on how much the dictator cares about his own
people.
4. Implicit and explicit costs.
a. Sanctions not only impose cost on the Target but on the Sender
as well. What is the risk?
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b. There is an implicit cost for the Sender to give a Target
alternate sources of trade thereby redefining trade away from the
sender.
c. There is the implicit and explicit nature of sanctions as a
function of the implementation cost of the sanction and the risk of
outcome. This is the expected cost and a risk the Sender must
consider.
5. Law of unintended consequences. The Sender imposes a sanction to
modify a regime. The objective to modify the regime fails, but the
sanction is successful in crippling the Target's economy and creating
a bigger problem than the original one.
6. Continuing versus lifting a sanction. How should a Sender respond if
the Target does not respond? How long should the Sender continue a
sanction if the original goal fails, and when should the Sender throttle
back? When is it beneficial to for the Sender to backdown? Why
continue with a sanction?
Economic operations in the information age require urgent reconsideration
and updating. This thesis addresses the economic aspect of coercive diplomacy
to show that new instruments of coercive economic operations created by
information age technology 1 ) redefine coercive economic operations and that 2)
the vulnerabilities and concerns brought about by these new economic
instruments change the impact coercive economic operations have on coercive
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diplomacy. The intent is to guide continuing future thought on coercive
economic operations. It is important that policy makers become aware of the
new information based economic instruments that impact coercive economic
diplomacy. Economic sanctions can provide a useful alternative or compliment
to diplomacy and military force, but without the constant upgrading and re-
examining of economic instruments, economic sanctions may not survive into the
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